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Commitment Devices: Using Initiatives to Change Behavior
Abstract
Unhealthy behaviors are responsible for a large proportion of health care costs and poor health outcomes.1
Surveys of large employers regularly identify unhealthy behaviors as the most important challenge to
affordable benefits coverage. For this reason, employers increasingly leverage incentives to encourage changes
in employees’ health-related behaviors. According to one survey, 81% of large employers provide incentives
for healthy behavior change.2 In this Viewpoint, we discuss the potential and limitations of an approach that
behavioral science research has shown can be used to influence health behaviors but that is distinct from
incentives: the use of commitment devices (Table).3
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CommitmentDevices
Using Initiatives to Change Behavior
Unhealthy behaviors are responsible for a large pro-
portionof health care costs andpoorhealthoutcomes.1
Surveys of large employers regularly identify un-
healthybehaviorsas themost importantchallenge toaf-
fordable benefits coverage. For this reason, employers
increasingly leverage incentives to encourage changes
inemployees’health-relatedbehaviors.Accordingtoone
survey, 81% of large employers provide incentives for
healthy behavior change.2 In this Viewpoint, we dis-
cuss thepotential and limitationsofanapproachthatbe-
havioral science research has shown can be used to in-
fluence health behaviors but that is distinct from
incentives: the use of commitment devices (Table).3
Many people intend to improve their health
behaviors in the future (eg, to exercise more, adhere
to medication regimens, eat healthy diets, quit smok-
ing), but when the future arrives, they fail to follow
through.4 People are not unaware of the challenges
associated with achieving their goals: many take steps
to precommit their “future selves” to follow-through.
For example, those eager to exercise more may buy
gymmemberships with annual contracts so future vis-
its will require no out-of-pocket expenses, or they will
schedule exercise with workout partners so failing to
show up will mean disappointing friends; persons
with alcoholism may take disulfiram in the morning so
drinking alcohol in the evening will make them ill.
These are examples of commitment devices—many of
which have no financial cost, but all of which deliber-
ately limit future choices. Commitment devices
attempt to enforce people’s voluntarily imposed
restrictions until they have accomplished their goals,
or their voluntarily imposed penalties for failing to
accomplish their goals.
Acommon formof commitmentdevice, also some-
times called a deposit contract or commitment con-
tract, involvespeoplevoluntarilydepositingmoney into
accounts that they can access again only if they accom-
plish a goal. Commitment devices like this have been
shown to help people lose weight, improve their diets,
exercisemore,andquit smoking.Onerandomizedstudy,
for example, found that access to a commitment de-
vice increased the rate at which smokers succeeded in
quitting after 6months by 40%.5
Commitment devices have 2 basic features. First,
peoplevoluntarily elect touse them.Thismeanspeople
mustbeself-awareenoughabout thegapbetweentheir
current goals and their likely future behaviors to recog-
nize thevalueof takingsteps to limit their futurechoices
and actions. Many people are unaware of this gap and
therefore fail tousecommitmentdevices. Second, com-
mitment devices associate consequences with peo-
ple’s failures to achieve their goals.
Commitment devices can be associated with a
spectrum of consequences. Immutable consequences
cannot be reversed by future choices. For example, if
a person with alcoholism takes disulf iram, she
imposes an unavoidable future physiological conse-
quence on herself (vomiting) if she later fails to
abstain from alcohol. Similarly, seeking care at a sub-
stance abuse or psychiatric facility can limit choice,
because one is typically not permitted to leave until
certain goals are achieved. Other commitment
devices involve immutable monetary consequences in
which people risk losing their own money if by a pre-
determined date an independent assessor reports
that these people did not accomplish their goals.
Commitment devices involving mutable conse-
quences constrain future behaviors while also allowing
people the future latitude to mitigate the conse-
quences. For example, purchasing unhealthy foods in
small portions can reduce food intake, purchasing only
small plates for home use or at a buffet can limit por-
tionsizes,purchasinggymmemberships can reduce the
visible costs of eachgymvisit, andorderinggroceries in
advance can reduce the likelihood of purchasing un-
healthy foods when shopping while hungry.6 Similarly,
temptationbundling, or allowingpeople to restrict their
access to instantly gratifying experiences (eg, watch-
ing TV) only to occasions when they engage in goal-
consistent behaviors (eg, exercising), is a form of mu-
table commitment device that increases gym
attendance.7
Building Better Commitment Devices
to Improve Health
Commitment devicesmaybepowerful tools for chang-
inghealthbehaviors, but theyareunderused.Forhealth
professionals andpatients togetmorevalueoutof com-
mitment devices, several areas of researchmust be ad-
vanced. Specifically, maximizing the population health
benefitsof commitmentdevices requires increasing the
proportionofpeoplewhouse thesedevicesand increas-
ing their effectiveness.
Increasing Uptake
Commitmentdevicescanonlyhelp thosewhousethem.
Uptake rates in research on commitment devices have
been as low as a few percentage points, for example.5
This lowuptake could in part be attributable to a lack of
patientawarenessaboutthegapbetween intentionsand
futurebehaviors. If so, healthprofessionals couldbe in-
strumental in educatingpatients about this gap.Behav-
ioral science techniques could also be used to increase
uptake. For example, requiring patients to opt out of
commitment devices, rather than attempting to con-
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vince patients to proactively opt in, could increase uptake.Opt-out
policies have been shown to increase enrollment in programs such
as organ donation and 401(k) savings plans and could similarly in-
creasecommitmentdeviceparticipation.Makingenrollmentandpar-
ticipation as simple as possible by eliminating unnecessary com-
plexity could also facilitate greater uptake of commitment devices.
In addition, as people become more experienced with commit-
ment devices, researchers will need to develop strategies for help-
ing patients who did not meet their past goals (and thus experi-
enced thenegative consequencesof commitmentdevices) elect to
reuse commitment devices despite their previous experiences.
Increasing Effectiveness atMinimal Cost
Forcommitmentdevices tomeaningfully improvepopulationhealth
they will need to be engineered to be more effective. First, many
health-relevant goals require changing long-termbehavior evenaf-
ter an initial objective has been achieved (ie, weight loss, medica-
tionadherence, andaddictionmanagement).More research should
examine whether and how commitment devices can be effective
maintenance tools, capable of assisting with long-term behavior
change.Expandingtheuseofcommitmentdevicestofacilitatehealth
maintenancewill likely requirenovel strategies formaintainingpeo-
ple’s engagement and attention at keymoments when drop-off or
discontinuation is a risk. Second, commitment devices can be en-
gineered toprovidepositive feedbackas soonaspeoplebeginusing
them. This will involve guiding people to choose challenging but
achievable initial goals; developingmechanisms tokeep thosegoals
salientatcriticalmoments; and leveragingadvances inwireless tech-
nologies tomakedynamic feedbackeasier, cheaper, andtimelier.De-
veloping commitment devices so their associated penalties in-
volve a range of consequences (beyond just monetary losses) will
likely increase their appeal.Onepromisingdirection for future com-
mitment device research involves leveraging the influence of exist-
ing social networks. Commitment devices that involve these net-
works by creating social consequences for failing to achieve goals
(ie, disappointing exercise partners, having family members in-
formed when patients do not adhere to medication regimens) can
be implemented inexpensively.
Conclusions
Patients are more successful at achieving their health goals when
they have access to commitment devices, and commitment
devicesareusually inexpensive toprovide.However,uptakeandon-
going participation rates in commitment devices are often low. Al-
though there have been some studies of highly effective commit-
ment devices, strategies for achieving higher rates of ongoing
engagementandsustainedbehavior changeareneeded for this tool
to have wide-scale influence and benefit. Leveraging existing so-
cial networks may be a potential low-cost means of achieving and
sustaining healthier behaviors through commitment devices.
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Table. Examples of Commitment Devices
Strategy Description Health Goal
Put money in a deposit contract Forfeit money by failure to achieve a specific goal by a given date (eg, quitting
smoking within 6 mo, losing 5 lb within 2 mo)
Any
Engage in temptation bundling Restrict access to instantly gratifying experiences (eg, watching TV) only to
occasions when engaging in goal-consistent behaviors (eg, exercising)
Any
Purchase vices in small packages Limit portion sizes for unhealthy items (eg, cigarettes, junk food, alcohol) Reduce consumption
Purchase small plates Limit food portion sizes Reduce consumption
Order groceries online Avoid purchasing unhealthy foods on impulse Improve diet
Take disulfiram Ensure that drinking alcohol in the future will cause illness Treat alcoholism
Seek care at a treatment center Ensure no access to addictive substances (eg, alcohol, drugs) until professionals
deem a patient ready
Treat addiction
Purchase an annual gym membership Ensure future gym visits will not require out-of-pocket payment Increase exercise
Schedule workouts with an exercise partner Disappoint a friend by failure to visit the gym Increase exercise
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